UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-22-2018

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 45200

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Lunneborg v. My Fun Life Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45200" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6902.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6902

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MY FUN LIFE CORP. , a Delaware
Corporation, DAN E. EDWARDS and
CARRlE L. EDWARDS, Husband and Wife
Defendants/ Appellants,
VS.

THOMAS LUNNEBORG,
Plaintiff/Respondent.

)
)
)
) Supreme Comt Docket No. 45200-2017
)
)
) Kootenai County Case No. CV-2014-8968
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
On Appeal from the decision of the District Comt of the First Judicial District
of the State ofldaho in and for the County of Kootenai;
Hon. John T. Mitchell District Judge, Presiding
Mary E. Shea, ISB #6115
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 N. Arthur Ave., 5 th Floor
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 232-2286
Facsimile: (208) 232-2499
Email: mary(@merrillandmerri II.com
Michael Hague, ISB #3574
HAGUE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
401 Front Avenue, Suite 2 12
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838154
Telephone: (208) 215-2400
Facsimile: (800) 868-0224
Email: mhague(tv,haguelawoffices.com
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants
My Fun Life, Corp; Dan E. Edwards and
Carrie L. Edwards

Michael F. Nienstedt, ISB #3 770
Christopher G. Varallo, ISB #6135
WITHERSPOON KELLEY
Attorneys and Counselors
The Spokesman-Review Building
608 Nmthwest Boulevard
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814-1246
Telephone: (208) 667-4000
Facsimile: (208) 667-8470
Email: mfn@witherspoonkel ley .com
Email: cgv(a),witherspoonkell ev.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
Thomas Lunneborg

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .... ................ ... ...................... .... ............. .ii
Summary of Argument. .............. ..... ...... ... ......... .. .. ...... ... .. ................ .... ..... ...... ... .1
Grounds for Te1mination for Cause can be Decided
By the Courts as a Matter of Law ................. ............. .. . ................ ..... ...... ...... ... ....... 3
Lunneborg Cannot Rise Above his Own Evidence
Concerning Termination for Cause ........................................................ ..... ....... ...... 6
Lunneborg is Bound by the Uncontradicted Evidence of
His Witness Carrie Edwards, and He Cannot Shift the Burden of
Proof to Defendants on Piercing the Corporate Veil ............... ................................ .... .. 13
The Attorneys' Fee Award by the District Court
Was Excessive and Unfair. ....... ....... ................ ........ . ... ..... ..... ............... ....... .. ..... .17
Conclusion .............................................................................................. .. .... 19
CERTIFICATES .......... . . ... .................. ....... ... ... ... ................... . ...... ............... ... 20

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Amato v. Landy, 416 Pa. 115,204 A.2d 914 (1964) ...... .. .. ... ..... ... ..... ........................ .. 13
Baldwin v. Sisters ofProvidence in Washington, Inc., 112 Wash.2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989)
(en bane) ..... ... ............................. . .. .. ... .... . .. . . .......... . . .. . ... . ..... ........ .......... ..... 4, 9
Brown v. Vance-Cooks, 920 F. Supp. 2d 6 1, 72 (20 13) ................................................ 10
Bucyna v. Risso Bros. Movers, Inc., 31 Ill.App.2d 31, 175 N.E.2d 640 (1961) ................ . .... 13
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall, International, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 93,948 P.2d 412 (1998) ............ 4
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 475, 199 P.2d 264,266 (1948) .... .... .... .. .. .. ... 6, 13, 14
Frogley v. Meridian School District, 155 Idaho 558,314 P.3d 613 (2013) ... . .. .. . ... ... . .......... .4
Horne v. Milrim, 226 Va. 133,3 06 S.E.2d 893 (1983) ................ ...... .......... ................. 13
Humes v. Young, 219 Miss. 417, 69 S.O.2d 245 (1954) ................................................ 14
Jameson v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 16 Cal.App. 5th 90 1,
225 Ca1Rptr3d 17 1 (2017) ....................... . ............ . ........................ ...... .. .. ...... ...4, 5
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 210 P. 1003 (1922) .... .. ...... ......... ... 9
Jubackv. Michaels Stores, Inc . . , 143 F.Supp. 3d 1195 (M.D. Florida2015) ........ . ............... 5
Proctor Elec. Co. v. Zink, 21 7 Md. 22, 141 A.2d 721 (195 8) ................. . . .. . ................... 13
Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co. , 100 Idaho 785,605 P.2d 963 (1980) .... . . .... 2, 3
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp. , 293 Or. 96,643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (en banc) .... ............ .4
Stacey Bird v. Cascade County, 386 Mont. 69,386 P.3d 602 (7 th Cir. 2016) . ............ .. . .. ...... 5
Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616,619, 930 P.2d 1361 , 1364 (1997) .... ........... ............ . 6
Tibbs v. Administrative Office ofthe Illinois Courts, 860 F.3d 502 (7 th Cir. 2017) ... ............ .. 5

II

Appellants My Fun Life Corp., a Delaware Corporation, Dan E. Edwards, and Carrie L.
Edwards (husband and wife), by and tlu·ough their attorneys of record Mary E. Shea, Men-ill and
Merrill Chartered, and Michael Hague, Hague Law Offices PLLC, state their Reply Brief as
follows:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Lunneborg asks this Comito uphold the District Court's findings on all issues as factually
based and supported by the record. Upholding the District Court's decisions in this case would
require this Comi to ignore well-settled law in this jurisdiction concerning the burden of proof on
employment decisions. It would allow trial comis throughout Idaho to substitute their own
judgment for that of an employer in a dispute concerning grounds for termination, in violation of
Idaho precedent and contrary to decisions in similar cases all over the country. It would ignore
the well-settled law in this jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions concerning the burden of proof
required in piercing the corporate veil. It would allow the separate and personal prope1iy of a
spouse of the owner of the corporation to be reached on a piercing the veil theory without requiring
any proof that the spouse controlled the corporation or had any decision-making authority
concerning the financial transactions in question. The District Court made multiple errors in its
legal analysis which resulted in faulty factual and legal findings. Applying the con-ect legal
standards, Lunneborg did not meet his burden of proof on just cause for termination; on piercing
the corporate veil generally; or on finding that the personal and separate property of Carrie
Edwards could be reached even though she is not an owner of MFL.
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Employers in Idaho must feel confident that if they conduct a reasonable investigation
concerning the conduct of their employees and find cause to terminate, an Idaho court will not
simply second guess that decision and substitute its own judgment as some "super personnel
committee." Corporate owners in Idaho must feel confident that corporate protections will not be
set aside and personal assets will not be reached without requiring strict proof of the elements
necessary to pierce the corporate veil. MFL and the Edwards ask this Com1 to take a very close
look at the record in this case, and to apply the law correctly, and to reverse the unsuppo1ted
findings of the District Comt.
Lunneborg argues that the District Comt made several factual findings that deserve this
Cami's deference on appeal and which support the final decision regarding termination for cause.
Respondent's Brief pp. 1-2. This Court has stated that a trial court' s reliance on only one side's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is disfavored, particularly where those findings
are not supported by the record. Rosecrans v. lntermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho 785,
789, 605 P.2d 963, 967 (1980).

In this case, findings of fact and conclusions of law were not

submitted, but instead the parties filed briefs in lieu of closing argument. The District Comt
adopted virtually all the factual asse11ions and legal arguments presented by Lunneborg, and
rejected virtually all the factual conclusions and legal arguments presented by MFL and the
Edwards. The District Court even after finding that the attorneys' fees request by Lunneborg
"shocked the conscience," awarded Lunneborg most of what was requested. This Court should
examine the record closely, because the District Court did not apply the law fairly and correctly to
the undisputed and admitted relevant and material facts in this case.

Appel lants' Reply Brief
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GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION FOR CAUSE CAN BE DECIDED
BY THE COURTS AS A MATTER OF LAW
Lunneborg argues that the District Court's findings on termination for cause and pretext
must be upheld because these determinations are factual in nature, and the District Court's findings
were based on substantial and competent evidence. Lunneborg cites the case of Rosencrans, supra,
for this proposition. In the Rosencrans decision, this Court did not discuss the trial court record in
detail, but this Court noted that in that case, the witnesses "disagreed about almost everything,"
and credibility of the witnesses was, therefore, determinative. 100 Idaho at 789,605 P.2d 963.
MFL and the Edwards recognize that this Court must give deference to the District Comi's
credibility determinations. In this case, however, most of the relevant and material facts are
undisputed, and credibility is not the primary issue. The evidence on which MFL relies to support
the decision to terminate was presented by and admitted by Lunneborg in his own testimony, and
through the testimony of his witnesses Richard Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer, and he cannot rise above
his own evidence as will be discussed more fully below. There were not many disputes of material
fact on the record in this case. Based on the undisputed and uncontroverted facts, including those
judicially admitted by Lunneborg through his own testimony, there were reasonable grounds to
terminate based on a good faith and appropriate investigation conducted by Dan Edwards about
the noncompete contract being negotiated behind his back.
The Idaho comis will not lightly second guess such decisions. A plaintiff employee's
burden of proof on pretext is not met by merely alleging some alternative grounds for termination.

Appellants' Reply Brief
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The plaintiffs butden is to provide substantial probative evidence to prove the profened grounds
were 1) not believed subjectively by the employer, or 2) not consistent or believable. The Idaho
courts give deference to nondiscriminatory employment decisions "even if the reason is foolish or
trivial or even baseless." Frogley v. Meridian School District, 155 Idaho 558, 556, 314 P.3d 613,
621 (2013).
This Court's aiticulation of this rule of law is consistent with the cases previously cited in
Appellants' Brief, pp. 29-30. As the Washington Supreme Comt, sitting en bane, stated in the
Baldwin decision (which was relied upon by the District Comt below), there are two threshold
issues presented when an employer terminates for just cause: 1) what is the meaning of "just
cause," and 2) who gets to make the decision. The Washington Court, consistent with the Oregon
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, and consistent with this Court's decision in
Frogley v. Meridian School District, decided that it is fundamentally and primarily the employer's
decision to dete1mine just cause, and it is the role of the comts to determine simply whether the
employer acted reasonably under the circumstances.

Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in

Washington, Inc. , 112 Wash.2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989), citing Simpson v. Western Graphics
Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (en bane); see also Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall,
International Inc. , 17 Cal.4th (1998).

If the employer acted reasonably and in good faith belief that the facts it relied upon were
true, a plaintiff employee caimot meet their burden of proof and persuasion on pretext. Comts all
over the country have dismissed employment termination for cause cases as a matter of law,
usually on summary judgment. For example, in Jameson v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company,

Appellants' Reply Brief
11468/mes

Page

14

16 Cal.App. 5th 901, 225 Ca1Rptr3d 171 (2017), the California court upheld summary judgment
for defendant employer, which terminated an employee for retaliating against a co-worker who
repo1ted safety violations. In that case, the employer did an investigation and reached suppo1ted
conclusions, but the plaintiff employee challenged the sufficiency of the investigation and
conclusions. The California Supreme Court held the issue was not whether the employer could
have conducted a better investigation or should have reached different conclusions - the issue was
whether the employer reached conclusions honestly after a reasonable investigation, and did not
act arbitrarily. 16 Cal.App . at 910-911, 225 CalRptr 3d 178-179. See also Tibbs v. Administrative

Office of the Illinois Courts, 860 F.3d 502 (7 th Cir. 2017) (summary judgment granted in favor of
defendant employer); Stacey Bird v. Cascade County, 386 Mont. 69, 386 P.3d 602 (7 th Cir. 2016);

Juback v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 143 F.Supp. 3d 1195 (M.D. Florida 2015) (dismissing cause to
terminate/pretext case on summary judgment, stating courts do not sit as a "super personnel
depaitment" that re-examines an entity' s business decisions).
Lunneborg succeeded in convincing the District Comt this case was a "good guy versus
bad guys" dispute, and Lunneborg succeeded in convincing the District Court that the Edwards
were the bad guys in every respect.

The Edwards do not agree the record supports this

characterization, but that is not the legal issue before this Court. If this Court agrees that the
undisputed and admitted material facts on this record demonstrate that MFL, acting through Dan
Edwards, conducted a reasonable investigation of the facts under the circumstances, and those
facts reasonably suppo1ted his decision to terminate Lunneborg, this Cowt must reverse the
District Court and enter final judgment in favor of MFL consistent with the law.

Appel lants' Reply Brief
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LUNNEBORG CANNOT RISE ABOVE HIS OWN EVIDENCE CONCERNING
TERMINATION FOR CAUSE

It is well-settled law in Idaho and throughout the country that a litigant cannot rise above
their own evidence. The rule in Idaho is that pai1y testimony offered into evidence is prima facie
proof of the facts asse11ed, and it will be binding if it is not contradicted. Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc.,
129 Idaho 616, 619, 930 P.2d 1361 , 1364 (1997). As this Com1 has explained, "[s]tatements
contained in the evidence of a party constitute informal judicial admissions on his pai1 which are
accorded the quality of prima facie proof and for purposes of the action must be taken as true."

Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470,475, 199 P.2d 264,266 (1948).
This case did not present a real credibility contest that needed to be resolved by the trier of
fact. Lunneborg testified unequivocally that the central purpose of his employment at MFL was
to be COO, and to lead development of products for the members of the multi-level marketing
company to distribute. (Tr. p. 27 1, L. 7-10). Lunneborg testified it was always his intent, Dr.
Todd Schlapfer's intent, and Dan Edwards' intent that Lunneborg and Dr. Schlapfer would work
together to develop products for MFL, and that was a primary reason why Lunneborg was hired
by MFL. (Tr. p. 316). Lunneborg testified that Dan Edwards had no experience in product
development, and that is why he need to recruit someone who did. (Tr. p. 167). Lunneborg
testified that he requested, and his previous employer agreed to pay him $5,000/month for a
consulting arrangement with OxyFresh, because he was an asset to OxyFresh and it would hurt his
former employer if he depai1ed without helping the company to transition to a future without him.
(Tr. p. 173-174). Lunneborg also testified he wanted this pay from OxyFresh to be a "bridge" until

Appel lants' Reply Brief
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his performance based salary increases kicked in at MFL, because he was taking a pay cut to work
for MFL. (Tr. p. 175).
Dan Edwards testified he knew about and supported Lunneborg's ongoing paid consulting
relationship with OxyFresh, provided it did not prevent Lunneborg from developing products for
MFL. (Tr. p. 502-503). This testimony was not rebutted. Both Dan and Lunneborg testified that
Lunneborg could not enter into a noncompete or similar agreement with OxyFresh that would
prevent Lunneborg from developing products at MFL, because such an agreement would defeat a
primary purpose of his employment at MFL. (Tr. pp. 337-340; p. 428-429; p. 507).
The evidence is undisputed because Lunneborg himself testified that on May 15, 2014, he
wrote to a message to Dan and Carrie Edwards stating:
Good news. I had over an hour face-to-face with RB [Richard Brooke] last night.
We are good now. He signed my consulting agreement. We have a mutual
understanding and ended upon on good terms. They will name me to the advisory
board and announce that I have taken an opportunity to grow my career. I'll stay
as an advisor and R&D guru on the advisory board. Six-month consulting
agreement. This gives them ample transition time.
(Tr. p. 210, L. 10-17). The evidence is additionally undisputed, because Lunneborg himself
testified that Brooke had not, in fact, signed any written consulting agreement with Lunneborg.
Instead, Lunneborg said they "shook hands" on the deal, which Lunneborg in his mind felt was as
good as a written agreement. (Tr. 335). There is no testimony that Lunneborg clarified this
distinction with the Edwards, although Lunneborg assumed they must have known there was no
written agreement when Brooke was requesting a written agreement containing a noncompete
clause be signed.

(Tr. 336-337).

Dan and Carrie Edwards reasonably assumed from this

representation by Lunneborg that they did not have to worry about Brooke 's desire for a non-

Appellants' Reply Brief
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compete agreement, because he had already signed a consulting agreement that did not require
one. Dan Edwards testified that he was confused because he learned there was never a written
consulting agreement between Lunneborg and OxyFresh for the first time at trial. Dan further
testified that regardless of whether the contract was oral or written, Brooke had made it clear to
Dan Edwards that in his view, Lunneborg's consulting agreement with OxyFresh was contingent
on Lunneborg not developing products for MFL as a multi-level marketing entity, and Brooke
would not permit Lunneborg to do so. (Tr. pp. 580-583).
The evidence is undisputed that between May 22, 2014 and July 15, 2014, Richard Brooke
expressed clearly, consistently, and multiple times to Lunneborg, Dr. Schlapfer, and ultimately on
July 15 to Dan Edwards, that Lunneborg could not continue to be employed in any capacity at
OxyFresh while developing competing products for MFL as a multi-level marketing company, and
any consulting agreement between OxyFresh and Lunneborg was conditioned on that
understanding. (Tr. pp. 211-212; pp. 338-342; p. 379; p. 513-520; Defendants' Exh. A. p. 38-39;
p. 200; p. 502; Plaintiffs Exhs. 25-28). It is additionally undisputed that Brooke was fine with
Lunneborg developing products for MFL in a retail capacity. (Defendants' Exh. A, pp. 202-203;
Plaintiffs Exh. 28, p. 10).
Lunneborg's witnesses Richard Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer testified consistently. Brooke
testified that Lunneborg told him repeatedly that he was not hired to develop products at MFL, a
statement which by Lunneborg's trial testimony was not true. (Plaintiffs Exh. 47, Tr. p. 41, L. 621; p. 344, L. 5-7). Dr. Schlapfer testified unequivocally that he knew from the beginning that
Brooke would "never" allow Lunneborg to develop product at MFL while he was in a paid

Appellants' Reply Brief
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consulting and advising relationship with OxyFresh. (Plaintiffs Exh. 48, Tr. p. 33-34). The only
real material disputes of fact in this case, aside from Lunneborg and Schlapfer' s assertions about
Dan Edward's request that they "knock off' an OxyFresh product, are between Lunneborg and
Brooke. Lunneborg testified that Brooke had agreed to continue the paid consulting airnngement
even though Lunneborg refused to sign the contract containing noncompete clause.

Brooke

testified he would not continue to employ Lunneborg on the consulting arrangement without the
noncompete clause, he believed Lunneborg had agreed to it in principal, and that was the basis for
his continued payments to Lunneborg and request that Dan and Carrie Edwards sign the
noncompete agreement.

The Idaho comis are not permitted to second guess Dan Edward's

reasonable decision under the circumstances to believe Brooke that Lunneborg would not be able
to develop products at MFL unless he quit his position with OxyFresh. When Lunneborg declined
to do that, Dan Edwai·ds had no choice but to terminate Lunneborg for being unable to fulfill one
of the central purposes of his job at MFL.
As the Baldwin court noted, the threshold question this Comi must answer is what
constitutes "good cause" to terminate when an employment contract does not define it. Employee
disloyalty, including full disclosure of all facts relevant to the employment relationship, is a
reasonable expectation of Idaho employers. Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho
348,353,2 10 P. 1003, 1005 (1922). It logically follows that breach of that duty of loyalty and full
disclosure would constitute just cause to terminate under Idaho law. The Idaho comis may also
look to the employment expectations understood by both parties to determine whether just cause
to te1minate exists. In this case, the evidence is undisputed that leading product development was

Appellants' Reply Brief
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a primary purpose of Lunneborg' s work for MFL. If Dan Edwards had a reasonable belief based
on a reasonable investigation of facts that Lunneborg could not or would not fulfill that job duty,
that would logically constitute just cause to terminate.
Lunneborg persuaded the District Court to chase some "red heITings" in this case, by
making findings of fact and law that are completely iITelevant to the reason why Lunneborg was
fired. This Com1 should not make the same mistake. For example, the District Court agreed with
Lunneborg that there was some legal significance to the fact that Lunneborg was hired to be COO
of MFL, and not just develop products for MFL. The undisputed fact that Lunneboi'g was also
hired by MFL to be its COO, and that MFL took no issue with Lunneborg's job performance as
COO, is irrelevant. As one court explained, "it is nonsensical to suppose that a plaintiff should be
able to demonstrate that an employer's stated reason for its adverse action is pretext for
discrimination merely because the employer cannot prove that the plaintiff was deficient in every
aspect of his job performance." Brown v. Vance-Cooks, 920 F. Supp. 2d 61, 72 (2013) (granting
summary judgment for defendant employer). MFL did not fire Lunneborg because he was not a
good COO. MFL fired Lunneborg because in the two months of his employment, he had made no
progress in leading product development, and because Dan Edwards learned after speaking with
Richard Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer that Lunneborg would never be able to lead product
development for MFL so long as he was still employed by OxyFresh. Defendant' s Exh. A, p. 500.
As another example, the District Court attached legal significance to the fact that there was
no final written consulting contract between OxyFresh and Lunneborg, and that Dan Edwards
relied on "false rumor" that there was one.

Appellants' Reply Brief
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seen for himself that there was contract being circulated between OxyFresh and Lunneborg,
because Lunneborg showed him the contract. Dan Edwards confirmed through his conversation
with Richard Brooke, CEO of OxyFresh, on July 15, 2014, that Brooke believed there was an
agreement being actively negotiated, and that Lunneborg's continued relationship with OxyFresh
depended on it. Although Lunneborg denied this, Edwards was not required to take Lunneborg's
word for it, especially after Brooke's position had been confirmed by Lunneborg' s good friend
and collaborator, Dr. Schlapfer.
Second and perhaps more importantly, Dan Edwards did not fire Lunneborg because he
thought there was an existing written noncompete contract. He fired Lunneborg, on the face of
the termination letter, because he believed Richard Brooke that Lunneborg had been negotiating
such a contract with OxyFresh. Edwards testified that Brooke could potentially sue if Lunneborg
violated that understanding, and Edwards believed, reasonably after investigating and talking to
the interested parties, that was the reason why Lunneborg was not making progress in developing
products for MFL. Lunneborg, and the District Court, completely ignored the legal exposure
Lunneborg's conduct created for MFL and the Edwards. If Lunneborg tried to develop products
for MFL, Brooke could have taken legal action based on OxyFresh' s perfo1mance of what he
thought was an agreement between OxyFresh and Lunneborg.
Lunneborg persuaded the District Court there was some legal significance to the fact that
Lunneborg could not have brought a product to market in the two months he was employed by
MFL, because Dan had to "green light" any product development, and because Dr. Schlapfer had
not been hired on contract with MFL. This is another red herring. The testimony of both

Appellants' Reply Brief
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Lunneborg and Edwards was that there was no expectation that Lunneborg had to bring products
to market within the first few months of his employment. (Tr. 169). Dan understood that was not
possible. On the face of the termination letter written by Dan Edwards, Lunneborg was terminated
because he was not making "any significant progress" to the end of bringing products to market,
and because he seemed to be stalling with product development. Defendant' s Exh. A, p. 500.
Lunneborg's own testimony establishes it was always the intent of Lunneborg, Dr. Schlapfer, and
Dan Edwards that Dr. Schlapfer would be brought on contract with MFL to help Lunneborg w ith
product development. At the time he was terminated, Lunneborg was preparing the agreement
with Dr. Schlapfer. The evidence is further undisputed because Lunneborg himself testified that
Lunneborg was expected to lead product development, because he and Dr. Schlapfer had the
expertise and experience, and Dan Edwards did not. (Tr. 418). Although Dan had final say on
what products would be developed, the evidence is undisputed Lunneborg was expected to bring
Dan Edwards feasible ideas for product development, and that he and Dr. Schlapfer were the
"expe1is" in that department. (Tr. pp. 167, 169). When Lunneborg did not do that, and when Dan
realized the reason why was the consulting aiTangement with OxyFresh based on his discussions
with Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer, Dan had no choice but to terminate Lunneborg for cause.
This Cowi should reject Lunneborg's attempts to argue he proved "pretext" through his
allegations, made for the very first time the day after Lunneborg and Dr. Schlapfer realized Dan
Edwards was considering firing Lunneborg, that Dan Edwai·ds asked them to illegally "reverseengineer" an OxyFresh product, and this was the "real reason" for the termination. By law, this
allegation is insufficient to prove pretext, unless Lunneborg can also persuade this Court that Dan

Appellants' Reply Brief
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Edwards did not subjectively and reasonably believe that Lunneborg had been negotiating a noncompete agreement with OxyFresh, and that Lunneborg could not or would not develop products
for MFL so long as he continued working for OxyFresh. The District Comt committed legal error
by not giving deference to Dan Edwards' factual dete1minations that Lunneborg did not make
"significant progress" leading product development for MFL, and the reasons for it. This Court
should reject Lunneborg' s invitation to do the same.

It should be remembered that the Idaho Wage Claims Act trebles damages, and therefore
the burden of proof must be followed strictly. Idaho courts cannot be cavalier in reciting facts that
are not material to the reason for termination in justifying such an award. Idaho courts must follow
the law and give appropriate deference to the reasonable factual findings of the employer justifying
the adverse employment action. On this record, Dan Edwards had adequate grom1ds to terminate,
and the District Court focused on irrelevant facts, and did not give Dan Edwards appropriate
deference as the primary fact finder on whether grounds to terminate existed.
LUNNEBORG IS BOUND BY THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE OF HIS
WITNESS CARRIE EDWARDS, AND HE CANNOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO DEFENDANTS ON PIERCING THE CORPORA TE VEIL
The general and well settled rule of evidence followed throughout the country,
acknowledged in part by this Court in the Crenshaw decision, supra, states that when a party uses
an adverse witness to prove elements of their claims, they are bound by that testimony if it is clear,
reasonable, and uncontradicted. See, e.g ., Horne v. Milrim, 226 Va. 133, 306 S.E.2d 893 (1983);
ProctorElec. Co. v. Zink,2 l7Md. 22, 141 A.2d 721 (1958);Amatov. Landy,4 l6Pa. l1 5, 204

A.2d 914 (1964); Bucyna v. Risso Bros. Movers, Inc., 3 1 Ill.App.2d 31, 175 N.E.2d 640 (196 1);
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Humes v. Young, 219 Miss. 417, 69 S.0.2d 245 (1954).

Lunneborg did not request specifically

to treat Carrie Edwards as an adverse witness, but no objections were made on the record to any
leading questions asked of Carrie Edwards.
Even if Carrie Edwards was not an adverse witness, then the general rule articulated above
and as stated in the Crenshaw case applies: Lunneborg cannot rise above his own evidence. He
called Carrie Edwards to prove his case in chief on piercing the corporate veil. Her testimony was
not impeached, and it was not contradicted. Lunneborg persuaded the District Court to find that
because Carrie's testimony concerning the accounting practices of the companies and the Edwards
was not "backed up" by actual bank statements and loan documents, it was not credible.
Lunneborg cannot call Carrie Edwards as a witness to prove the elements of his case related to
piercing the corporate veil, and then ask the Court to find her testimony incredible because it was
not bolstered by documentation. Lunneborg in his Respondent's Brief does not disagree that he
bears the burden of proof and persuasion on piercing the corporate veil. Requiring Carrie Edwards
to bolster her testimony through additional documentation effectively and improperly shifts the
burden of proof to the Defendant to demonstrate that their financial transactions were legitimate
to avoid liability. It was Lunneborg' s burden to prove the financial transactions of MFL and the
Edwards were not legitimate or accounted for properly; it was not the Edwards ' burden to prove
they were.
Lunneborg produced no evidence that challenged or contradicted Carrie Edward' s
testimony that funds and debts were properly segregated between the various corporations and
between Dan and Carrie Edwards personally; that all compensation received by Dan and Canie
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Edwards and their children were pursuant to the membership agreements and the legitimate and
legal business plan of MFL; that all funds received by the Edwards from MFL were reported
properly for income tax purposes; that automobile expenses were segregated by proper accounting
procedures and based on the advice of an accountant; that all loans between entities were paid back
among the entities, to the penny; and that rent and building maintenance payments between the
entities were shared equitably. Carrie's testimony was clear, and it was supported by spreadsheets
she downloaded from the bookkeeping systems of the entities which were offered and admitted
without objection as to foundation or for any other reason. Her testimony was uncontradicted by
any other documents or testimony offered by Lunneborg. The District Court committed legal error
by rejecting that testimony because it was not bolstered by additional documentation, instead of
holding Lunneborg to his very high burden of proof on piercing the corporate veil.
It must also be remembered that most of the financial transactions complained of by

Lunneborg as some suggestion of impropriety by the Edwards occurred before Lunneborg was
even hired. They could not, as a matter of law, evidence an intent to defraud him or create an
unjust result.
Finally, even though Idaho law holds, and the District Court recognized that MFL's
bankruptcy is not enough to pierce the corporate veil, the District Court did find the bankruptcy to
be evidence of the Edwards' "depletion" of the corporation, although there was no proof offered
of such depletion between the years 20 14-20 16. The evidence was uncontradicted and supported
by Lunneborg 's own testimony that MFL was flush with cash and was growing in 2013 and 20 14.
By July 20 14, Lunneborg testified that he realized MFL membership was waning. He testified
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that he knew this was caused, in paii, by the failure to bring new products for members to
distribute. (Tr. 397, 396-397). Lunneborg testified there were other legitimate reasons for the
decrease in membership in 2014 (Tr. 396-397), and he testified that he did not believe raising
membership prices without offering more products or services would be an appropriate way to
address the downward business trajectory. (Tr. 202-203). Carrie Edwards testified as Lunneborg 's
witness, and her testimony was uncontradicted, that by late 2014 and 2015, MFL was losing
members and therefore losing money, to the point where the Edwards' other entity TraffiCorp was
propping it up financially, and it was clear MFL would not survive. (Tr. pp. 53-55; 141-145).
There was vi1iually no evidence produced to supp01i any inference that it was improper depletion
of the corporate resources by the Edwards between 2014 and 2016 that caused the company to go
bankrupt. The only evidence on this record is that MFL was losing members, at least in part
indisputably because they did not bring new products to market for members to distribute in 2014
or subsequent.
Lunneborg does not dispute the Edward's legal position that a creditor cannot reach the
personal assets of a corporate non-shareholder absent proof that the non-shareholder effectively
controlled the financial decision making of the corporation. There was absolutely no evidence
offered by Lunneborg on this issue. All that was asked of Carrie Edwards during her testimony
was her job titles. She was not asked to explain her job duties. The fact that she helped recruit
Lunneborg and attended meetings and discussed Lunneborg's employment is inelevant; the
District Court found c01Tectly that Carrie Edwards was not sued directly for her role in the
termination of Lunneborg.
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The District Court found that Carrie Edwards "moved the money" between the entities, but
there were absolutely no questions asked of Carrie to prove this. Can-ie testified extensively about
her knowledge about the bookkeeping and accounting practices of all the entities, but she was
never asked, and she never testified, about who made the bookkeeping and accounting decisions
for MFL. Even if she physically moved the money, and the record is silent about that, there was
no testimony adduced to prove this was based on her own decision making. No other witness,
including Dan Edwards, was asked about Carrie's decision-making authority for MFL or her
control of the finances of MFL. As a matter of law, Lunneborg did not meet his burden of proof
to pierce the corporate veil for Carrie Edwards as a non-shareholder. This Court must, at a
minimum, reverse this paii of the District Court's judgment.

It is the unusual set of facts that

would allow a court to pierce the corporate veil to reach the personal assets of a non-owner of a
corporation.

Idaho courts ought not permit veil piercing for non-owners when the proof of

financial control for the purpose of self-dealing and defrauding creditors was not adduced on the
record.
THE ATTORNEYS' FEE A WARD BY THE DISTRICT COURT
WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNFAIR

MFL and the Edwards will not restate their arguments previously made. Lunneborg
complains that MFL and the Edwards did not prove that the plaintiffs investment of legal
resources was unreasonable for a three-day trial. The District Court found that the fees requested
were excessive for a factually and legally uncomplicated three-day trial, the demand shocked the
court's conscience, and they were unprecedented in the trial judge's fifteen years on the bench.
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That is proof that the investment of legal resources was unreasonable under the circumstances.
The District Comi committed error by arbitrarily slicing the fee by only ten percent on that basis,
and by reducing hourly fees only slightly. Allowing five attorneys to bill time on a case like this
was not reasonable w1der the circumstances. Defendants only had one attorney to present their
case, which he did competently.
Lunneborg complains that MFL caused him to invest more time in the case due to the
discovery disputes. The record is undisputed, however, that attorneys' fees award related to that
discovery dispute was $8,823 .75. That is the proper and fair measure of the legal cost of that
discovery dispute to Lunneborg.

Lunneborg employs hyperbole to suggest that it was the

discovery delay that permitted the Edwards' to loot the company and deplete assets, without
providing any proof whatsoever that improper depletion of MFL assets occurred between 2014
and 2016. Fmther, by Lunneborg's own timeline, the discovery dispute was first raised as an issue
in July 2015, and it was resolved by early October 2015. Respondent's Brief, p. 3-4. It is ludicrous
to suggest that the discovery dispute or the bankruptcy of MFL complicated this litigation
sufficient to justify an award of $167,028.69. This award amounted to a trial cost of $55,676.23
per day. Five attorneys and I 048 hours were not required to competently try this case, and even
with that investment of resources, Lunneborg failed to meet the elements of proof on his claims.

It should be noted that part of Lunneborg' s justification for including the discovery dispute in the
final attorneys' fee award was to avoid the fact that only MFL was the defendant during the
discovery dispute resulting in the first attorneys' fee judgment, and MFL is now insolvent. This
Comt should reverse the District Comt on the substantive legal issues and enter final judgment in
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favor of MFL and the Edwards, and render this issue moot. If this Court affinns or remands any
issue, this Comi must direct the District Court to re-examine this award and reduce it down to a
something more reasonable.

CONCLUSION
The District Court committed legal errors in its analysis of the breach of contract claim and
piercing the corporate veil. The District Court's attorneys' fee analysis evidence a desire to punish
the Defendants for alleged malfeasance, even though there was no malfeasance shown on this
record. This Comi should reverse the decisions, and find that MFL and the Edwards are not liable
to Lunneborg, and grant any other relief deemed appropriate.
Dated this l 8th th day of January 20 18.
MERRILL AND MERRILL CHARTERED

By:
Mar) ' E hea
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